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This paper outlines the results of a series of 15 interviews 
undertaken to establish the methods and tools currently used to 
support risk assessment in industry. The interviews covered 
general risk assessment, but also looked specifically at human 
factors tools and methods in use, both in terms of the 
representation of the system under analysis and in terms of human 
reliability analysis or other tools to identify and analyse human 
error. The results show that, of the companies interviewed, only 
five use any form of structured technique to analyse human 
factors, and two of these companies had specific human factors 
teams to undertake the analysis. This points to a gap in risk 
assessment, as the lack of inclusion of human factors in risk 
assessment is in stark contrast to the high attribution of major 
accidents to human error. Possible reasons for this gap are 
discussed along with the need to better include guidance on human 
factors assessment in the applicable standards. 
Introduction 
The contribution of human performance, which has its roots in human and 
organisational factors (HOF), to major accidents is often cited as between 70% 
and 80% (e.g. Shappell & Wiegmann, 1997) and human and organisational 
factors are understood to have a dominant influence on safety in the offshore oil 
and gas industry with approximately 80% of accidents attributable to 
unanticipated actions of people during operations and maintenance activities 
(Bea, 1998). These statistics make clear the importance of accounting for human 
and organisational factors in risk assessments in order to manage safety.  Major 
accidents, including Piper Alpha, Chernobyl and Three Mile Island have all had 
human factors described as a root cause (Gordon, 1998). 
Direct human factors contributions to accidents and incidents tend to be 
described as human errors (Reason, 1990). Various factors including biological 
factors (e.g. age, gender, size, handicaps), physical condition, mental condition, 
competence, and personality may all contribute to human performance. All of 
these can be managed to some degree by the organisation, and the failure to do 
so can be regarded as an organisational contribution to an accident. 
Organisational factors may not be as readily identified during an accident 
investigation, as they tend to require a deeper level of analysis than is always 
performed following an accident/incident. Leveson (2011) suggests that 
organisational factors are frequently not identified because traditional accident 
investigation models stop once an immediate causal event has been identified. 
Therefore, the factors leading an operator towards an error are not analysed. 
Organisational factors can include management commitment to safety, training, 
communications, stability of the workforce, supervison and teamwork, among 
others (Gordon, 1998). 
The primary approach to risk assessment uses established tools and methods 
developed to identify and quantify technical risks, such as HAZOP, risk 
matrices, FMEA, etc. These tools were originally developed to account for 
technical risks, and not for human performance, although some attempts have 
been made to incorporate human factors (e.g. human HAZOP; Kirwan, 2005). 
The limitations of traditional quantitative risk assessments methods are 
illustrated by Einarsson & Brynjarsson (2008) who describe an actual fire at a 
chemical storage facility; the facility was retrospectively analysed through a 
quantitative risk assessment (QRA) including a HAZOP for the entire plant. The 
results of the QRA indicated that the plant was safe by international standards. 
Einarsson & Brynjarsson suggest that this result could only have occurred if the 
significant human and organisational factors at work in the accident were not 
sufficiently captured by the risk assessment. 
Human factors approaches to risk assessment tend to start with an analysis of the 
human activities, typically using a form of task analysis. Without a good 
representation of the human tasks and activities within the system it is difficult to 
identify with any confidence where human errors can occur. There are then a 
number of tools for identification of human errors, including SHERPA (Embrey, 
1986), TRACEr (Shorrock & Kirwan, 2002), and human HAZOPs (Kirwan, 
2005). Some analyses may base control measures and design changes on the 
results of the human error identification phase, but human reliability assessments 
(HRA) go on to quantify the probability of an error. The benefit of HRA is that 
human error mechanisms can be analysed and prioritised within a systems 
context, allowing human factors specialists to identify the critical areas for 
improvement (Kirwan, 2005). Again, there are a number of techniques available 
to conduct a HRA, including THERP (Swain & Guttman, 1983), HEART 
(Williams, 1985), CREAM (Hollnagel, 1998), and a wide range of nuclear 
specific tools (e.g. SPAR-H (Gertman et al, 2004), ATHEANA (USNRC, 2004), 
HFW (Embrey & Zaed, 2010) and MERMOS (Pesme et al., 2007).  
Human factors specialists may also use a wide variety of methods relating to 
mental workload assessment, equipment and control room design, fatigue 
management, user interface design, etc. to design systems for optimal human 
performance, but these are not considered to be part of the risk assessment 
process here. 
The approaches and tools briefly outlined above are known within the human 
factors domain, and HRA in particular is widely used in the nuclear industry, but 
the level of adoption of techniques to identify and mitigate human and 
organisational risks in wider industry (i.e. those who may not have internal 
human factors teams) is not known. These interviews sought to establish the risk 
assessment processes of the companies surveyed and the incorporation of human 
and organisational factors within that. 
Study Methodology 
The interviews were undertaken as a collaborative effort as part of the Innovation 
through Human Factors in Risk Analysis and Management (InnHF) project. The 
15 semi-structured interviews were conducted across five different European 
countries using a standard interview template. The majority of the interviewees 
worked in the processing industry, but interviews were also undertaken in the 
transport, energy production, and manufacturing domains. Participants were 
primarily chosen from the partner companies in the project and other contacts. 11 
of the interviewees held positions in risk analysis or safety management, two 
were human factors specialists, and two were production managers.  
The interview questions were drafted based on the risk assessment process as 
described in ISO: 31000 and covered both design and operational/in-service risk 
assessments. The objectives were:  
• To collect information about the risk assessment process used in the 
companies 
• To collect information about the data and tools available to companies 
to perform the risk assessment 
• To identify how human and organisational factors are accounted for in 
the process and tools 
Only the data relevant to the third objective is presented in this paper. 
The interview was divided in to three sections: 
• The background to the risk assessment 
• The risk assessment process 
• Management of risk 
Companies were approached to determine their willingness to take part, usually 
either the safety department or, where it existed, the human factors department 
were contacted. The interviews were undertaken face-to-face if possible, run by 
the researchers on the InnHF project, all of whom had previously been trained on 
interview techniques. If face-to-face interviews were not possible, the interviews 
were conducted over the telephone. All interviews were recorded. The countries 
in which the interviews were undertaken included Italy (eight interviews), 
Ireland (three interviews), Serbia (two interviews), UK (one interview) and 
France (one interview). Following the interviews, the recording was transcribed 
or detailed notes were drawn up. These documents were used for the analysis, 
which was a thematic-led qualitative analysis.  
Results 
The topics of relevance to human factors within the interviews were: 
• Standards used to support risk assessment 
• Representation of human tasks and activities within the system 
• Human factors methods and tools used in risk assessment 
The companies used a wide variety of standards to support risk assessment and 
safety management, including internal standards, industry standards, national 
standards (or regulations), and international standards. OHSAS 18001, ISO 
9001, and ISO 14001 were the most common international standards used by the 
companies surveyed. However, none of the interviewed companies mentioned 
any human factors standards as supporting their risk assessment and, despite 
stating that human factors are important, there is a paucity of guidance in the 
standards on incorporating human factors within safety assessments. This shows 
a gap in the standards, which could either be filled by a specific human factors 
risk assessment standard, or perhaps more beneficially by providing more and 
better human factors guidance in the existing risk assessment standards which 
have already been adopted by companies. The key results for task representation 
and human factors (HF) risk assessment are shown in Figure 1: 
 
Figure 1: Numbers of companies undertaking HF assessments 
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Of the 15 companies surveyed, only six had some form of representation of 
human tasks and activities. All of these were based around Task Analysis. This 
illustrates that Task Analysis is a broadly accepted approach to representation of 
human tasks and activities within a system, but that the general idea of using this 
kind of information in a risk assessment is not as common as might be hoped. 
Without a formal representation of the human tasks, the risk assessment cannot 
have a firm structure on which to base its assessment of the risk associated with 
human factors. Although not using a structured technique, several organisations 
did include operations and maintenance staff in HAZOP or other risk assessment 
meetings in order to try to bring their expertise and knowledge to the assessment. 
“The main tool is attendance of the people to the risk 
assessment meeting, they way they can provide their 
experience to the process” 
However, this method of including operational expertise to cover human factors 
is limited for several reasons, First, as mentioned by one of the interviewees, the 
input of the operators may be hit and miss: 
“We encourage the supervisors to visit the site and they do risk 
assessment and discuss it with the people involved, but in 
practice we suspect that this is done in an office and is copied 
from the previous one” 
This may be because, as in the experience of this organisation, the operators are 
not always consulted as expected, or because the operational experiences of the 
operators themselves are not sufficient to identify all possible failure modes. The 
second reason that this approach is limited is the lack of structure involved. It 
relies entirely on the operators raising issues as they occur to them during the 
meeting without any attempt to ensure that the full range of potential human 
activities is accounted for. 
All companies interviewed used a risk assessment method of some type, with 
risk matrices being the most common (used by eight companies). This is likely 
because risk matrices are relatively simple to understand and apply. More 
complex methods, such as FMEA and Fault Trees or Event Trees, were used by 
only four companies. In contrast to the wide (if varied) usage of risk assessment 
tools, only five companies reported using specific human factors tools for risk 
assessment. The analysis tools used in this sample included: 
• A second generation HRA method  
• TRACEr  
• HEART  
• Method Statements – modified to capture human factors risks 
• Incident reporting/recording 
• World Class Manufacturing approaches for human factors 
• A company specific human performance modelling tool  
Only the two companies with human factors specialists used known human 
factors tools; all the remaining companies used modified or general tools to 
address human factors risks. One company also stated that they were too focused 
on occupational health and safety risks related to manual handling: 
“That’s all we seem to do, and that’s all every company seems 
to do, is concentrate on manual handling whereas there’s a lot 
more going on. We miss an awful lot.” 
In contrast to the representation methods, there was a wide variety of tools and 
methods used for human factors risk assessment (seven approaches across five 
organisations). This could be due to differing requirements of different industries 
or it could represent a level of dis-satisfaction with current available analysis 
methods, which means that no single approach has yet emerged as best practice 
in the area. Another possible reason is that risk assessment companies do not 
have specific expertise in human factors and therefore are not comfortable with 
its inclusion: 
“If you are expert in natural or technological risks you often 
need the expertise from someone else to deal with human 
factors” 
This again points to a need for more guidance for risk professionals in how to 
incorporate human factors in their assessments. It is not realistic that all 
companies will have access to human factors expertise to conduct their risk 
assessment, although companies with a particularly high level of risk linked to 
human error should continue to use specialists. The high use of risk matrices as a 
risk assessment tool suggests that many companies are most comfortable with a 
simplistic approach to risk assessment. There is therefore a need for simple 
methods or approaches that can be easily described and applied as part of the risk 
assessment process.   
Conclusions 
In terms of human and organisational factors, there was very low usage of human 
factors tools and methodologies among the interviewed companies. Only five 
companies specifically included HOF in their risk assessment process, and since 
two of the interviewees were specialists in this area, only three companies 
without a specialist team included HOF in their analysis. Despite the small 
sample size, this points to a clear gap in risk assessment across all industry 
domains, particularly given the high prevalence of human and organisational 
factors in major accidents. This result reinforces the view that human factors are 
still not adequately addressed in risk assessment and safety management (e.g. 
Taylor, 2012). The recommendation on the basis of this research is to support 
better analysis of human and organisational factors risks by providing more, 
better, and simple guidance on the identification and analysis of human error in 
the most relevant standards, building on the existing guidance available (e.g. 
Henderson & Embrey, 2012; Widdowson & Carr, 2002). The IEHF can assist in 
this by collecting together the current best practices, developing or identifying 
appropriate training, and promoting these in collaboration with other professional 
institutions. 
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